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Abstract 
INERIS (French National Institute for Industrial Environment and Risks) is involved in assessing accidental and chronic risks in 
industrial or underground activities. Concerning carbon dioxide storage, INERIS performs integrated risk assessment studies, by 
integrating both its know-how in industrial safety and the knowledge developed in the context of other underground storages: 
hydrocarbons, landfill, nuclear waste. 
Concerning the future development of the CCS technology, a major question is the underground evolution of the CO2 at medium  
and long time scales. It is necessary to undertake a systemic approach in order to consider all targets at stake and all stages of the 
CCS chain. INERIS developed a specific method that includes the tools that are used in environmental, health and safety risks. At 
first, a risk analysis was performed, leading to identify the relevant risk scenarios. There we took into account the possible high 
content of impurities, and therefore the different exposure routes for man and for the soil/water environment. 8 main “Impacting 
phenomena” were defined, they cover the whole CCS chain (capture, transport, injection and long-term storage) and include both 
accidental and long-term effects.  
Each Impacting phenomenon gets a series of causes, that were represented in fault trees and were described in a dynamic graph 
through an adequate software tool. In a second step, the risk scenarios are to be quantified in terms of transfer and effects to the 
environment, and the estimated flows are to be compared to critical flows. This overall method consists of an integrated risk 
assessment, and helps in managing the risk for all life stages and all elements of the CCS chain, either at surface level or in the 
underground. 
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1. Introduction 
The CCS still needs to demonstrate its feasibility at reasonable cost, but also has to demonstrate its harmlessness, 
in other terms we have to demonstrate that we know its risks and that we are able to manage them, regarding both 
environment and human health & safety. This paper grasps this issue by drawing a generic frame for risk assessment 
of CCS and showing a graphic tool that represents the risk scenarios in a “risk model”, before quantifying their 
impact with a physical model. This framework is based on the present knowledge in underground sciences –
including the study of other underground storages such as hydrocarbons and nuclear waste– but also on the 
experience gained by INERIS in industrial safety (i.e. application of the Seveso Directive) as well as in risk 
assessment for toxic substances in the environment. The study contributes to designing a risk assessment method 
this is suitable for the whole CCS risks, both in the shorter and in the longer term, and for surface and underground 
features. 
 
2. The 4 main elements of the system to be studied  
The whole CCS technology can be seen as a chain composed of 4 main elements [9]: 
Capture stage, including several process steps and the final compression. Hence the capture system will consist 
of several sub-systems that are mainly industrial processes.  
 
Transport : the CO2 is compressed or condensed to be transported by a pipe to a storage area where it will be 
injected. In case of pipe transport, gates or valves, intermediate storages and re-compression stages may be 
necessary to operate the pipe or to ensure its safety. 
 
Injection : The injection step is crucial and the CO2 injectivity study is of utmost importance since it combines 
the injection well and its main pipe, with its specific technology (casing, tubing with several stages, etc.) and the 
well foot within the reservoir. It is important to notice that along the well a specific zone within the rock (excavation 
damaged zone EDZ) will appear during the drilling of the well, and may play a key role in future leakage paths.  
 
Storage : The main issue here is to consider the long-term evolution of the storage, which is essential both to 
assess the feasibility and to assess the risks. A series of complex processes have to be considered within the storage, 
especially in the longer term, which raises the issue of the related uncertainty. 
It is essential to mention here that these processes are likely to concern other layers over the storage itself: the 
caprock that has to remain impermeable, the overburden, the EDZ (excavation disturbed zone) around the well, the 
neighbouring faults or ancient wells (etc.).  In our risk method, all these elements are included and each event that 
will be defined will also be given a relation with the relevant system or sub-system.  
 
Besides, a very specific property of CCS is that very different time periods have to be considered [7]. Firstly, 
the exploitation phase that will last for approximately 50 years -including conception, construction and CO2 
injection. Secondly, a memory phase, for about 200 years after the completion of injection wells, where mankind 
will keep the memory of the storage ; this phase will include the monitoring of the site, but this monitoring will not 
necessarily cover the whole phase. And finally a long-term phase, that should cover at least one millenary in order to 
ensure the efficiency of the CCS; during this phase the existence of the storage is forgotten, hence specific events 
may occur. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig.1 : Simplified scheme of the CCS chain and its 4 main elements 
+ superfitial overburden, EDZ, faults, other wells 
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Our risk assessment framework includes this time dimension, since the risk scenarios include the events that are 
likely to occur on each element of the system, during each period that is relevant. Besides, the final calculation of 
the probability of the events takes into account their duration and the relevant time period [9]. This will allow a final 
representation of risk scenarios that improves the usual 2-dimentional risk matrix –which combines i) the Severity of 
effects and ii) the Probability of Occurrence – by including the time dimension.[7] 
 
3. A specific frame for Risk Analysis  
A risk scenario is a chain of events that begins with a specific hazard –e.g. a toxic substance– that is emitted into 
the environment, and ends with the exposure of a stake at risk – e.g. affect on an ecosystem after migration of the 
substance within the environment. The principle is similar for an accidental scenario such as an explosion that 
causes a human injury after transmission of an overpressure in the air [6] [13]. Risk Analysis first consists of 
identifying all relevant and plausible scenarios, in order to give a full image of the risk inherent to a CCS system.[15]  
 
The experience of INERIS in risk analysis on both industrial systems and underground sciences shows that all 
methods used for risk analysis or risk assessment are based on set of events and scenarios, either formalized (e.g in a 
specific guidance or in a FEPs database : Features, Events , Processes) [18] or not (e.g in the mind of the experts). In 
the literature, some methods entail a very specific type of analysis and may lose the overview of the whole CCS 
chain, e.g. being bond to a detailed modeling on the reservoir.  
 
The approach we develop here is close to systematic approaches such as the “What-If” or the PRA method 
(Preliminary Risk Analysis) -that were already used for small parts of the CCS chain- but the main advantage is that 
it is completed by an event-tree analysis method, with a chart that illustrates the cause-consequence relationships. 
The final collection of risk scenarios defines the « risk model » of the system under study. 
 
In order to carry out this exhaustive approach and to derive adequate relationships between events, we considered 
3 major inputs: the scientific literature, the learning from experience (accidents and incidents) and a series of 
interactive workshops (brainstorming) within an expert group that gathers experience in different scientific or 
technical fields –the objective is to continue this exercise with other experts and actors, such as industrialists, 
researchers, and NGOs if possible.  
 
We have defined several specific classification of systems and events, and especially a series of 8 “impacting 
phenomena” (IP) [7], e.g. explosion or fire, massive or diffuse emanation at the surface level, groundwater pollution, 
mechanical effects at the surface level. Each IP is the final event of the risk scenario, with a direct effect on one of 
the targets at stake (ecosystem, humans, economical activity). These IP are based on a thorough review of the 
literature and they gather all possible risk scenarios on the whole CCS chain (surface and underground elements). 
They cover at the same time “altered evolution” of the system - i.e. accidents or events that can only happen if the 
CO2 does not behave as scheduled - and “normal evolution”. 
 
These IP are not related only to the effects of CO2 itself, but also to other substances, e.g. for the pollution of 
underground waters and the emanations at the surface level. These substances can have three origins: i) impurities 
injected with the CO2 ; ii) native gases that were originally in place in the reservoir (e.g methane) ; iii) other 
chemical compounds that may be dissolved within the reservoir by the CO2 or the acidified brine (e.g. heavy metals, 
actinides) [14] [21].  
 
In order to represent these cause-consequence relationships, INERIS choose the BowTie software (under the 
InOV platform developed together with Interactive), which comprises at the same time i) a database that capitalises 
the properties of each object (element of the system, or event), ii) a specific graphic interface that helps in defining 
the events and their cause-consequence relationships, and iii) the possibility to formally include the MMR 
(measures for the management of risks) on the event-trees.  
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4. Risk scenarios in a graphic event trees : the example of diffuse emanation of CO2 
The figure 4 shows an example of event tree, with all main scenarios leading to a Diffuse Emanation of CO2 
mixture at the surface level (IP #3), in the longer term. The full detail is given only for the events and processes at 
the beginning of the tree, leading to a migration through the caprock [5] [12] - the migration through the superior 
overburden, top right of the figure, is continuing. On the right part of the figure we can see the 4 main events or 
processes that lead to such a migration through the caprock.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig.2. Scenarios leading to a Diffuse Emanation  
of CO2 mixture at the surface level (impacting phenomenon #3) 
 
We can detail here the consequence of overpressure due to the injection, which is likely to induce a fracturation 
of the rock. This effect will most probably be very localised and limited in time since the pressure will be 
significantly reduced a few decades after the injection stops. We are here in “normal conditions”, but they may 
occur at the interface between the storage and the caprock, hence a migration scenario through the caprock is not 
impossible [1]. Practically, as shown on the event tree, it is more likely that this overpressure will cause the re-
opening of pre-existing fractures, especially if such fractures were present but not detected [11]: see the “And” door 
in the fault tree. 
 
The lower part of the event tree describes events and processes that may occur at the level of the injection well, 
gathering both “normal situations” (e.g. degradation of the cement with time, which in turn has several causes : 
normal ageing, chemical degradation with brine or CO2...) and “altered situations” such as an initial bad quality of 
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the cement [2] [4]. This part also shows that the possible migration within or along the well may have numerous 
pathways and especially at the interface between elements of the well: the casing, the cement, the casing-cement 
interface, the cement-rock interface [3].  
 
Finally this part of the event tree illustrates same possible interactions between processes, e.g. we can identify 
that cement degradation may be initiated by a mechanical or thermal stress, and that chemical processes in the 
cement or the steel may induce gas migration. In fact, this shows a second advantage of the software tool, that helps 
in defining the interaction between processes and events before integrating them into numeric models if necessary. 
And we should not forget that this graphic tool is connected to a database, where events can be given adequate 
categories – for example by identifying the categories of mechanical processes, thermal processes, chemical 
processes, or by distinguishing processes and events that occur in the shorter term vs those that occur only in the 
longer term (this is not illustrated here in the previous figure, although it is done in the database). 
 
The use of a physical model is of course of great help, for 3 reasons. Firstly, it allows to confirm or infirm a risk 
scenario. For example Thoraval et al. [20] and Azaroual et al. [1] conclude that in the particular situations they 
explore, the risk of direct rock fracturation due to normal injection pressure is hardly relevant. Secondly, the 
quantitative result of the model may be used to estimate the probability of the cause-consequence relationship within 
this risk scenario – if it is confirmed. And thirdly the model can give a quantitative estimate of the consequence, e.g. 
the intensity of the CO2 migration towards the surface or towards an aquifer, like Smyth et al. 
[19] who estimate that 
for a specific CO2 injection site in Texas, there is no trend of degradation of water quality, according to drinking 
water standards and comparing to neighbouring areas. However we may mention that this estimation does not take 
into account the fate of impurities or annex substances. 
 
This quantitative estimation led by INERIS will be detailed in a future paper. It can be noted already that the 
extensive use of a model allows a parametric study, by exploring in a quantitative way a wide range of possible 
cases – as stated by Nordbotten et al. [17] for a contamination of aquifers, or Meyer et al. [16] for a CO2 leakage at the 
surface level along an injection well. Apart from the final representation of all scenarios in a matrix as described 
earlier, our objective is that for a given risk scenario the quantitative estimate of CO2 flow  -or flow of impurity-  is 
compared to a “critical flow”: this critical flow is the maximum flow that is supposed to cause no effect on the 
stakes at risk (human health, ecosystem), and it is calculated separately with its proper uncertainty estimation. 
 
5. Conclusion 
Abnormal (or altered) evolution scenarios are possible, such as emanation at the surface level, contamination of 
underground water resources or major pipeline leakages. Even in a normal evolution, the CO2 storage will have an 
impact on its reservoir and it surroundings, and some specific processes will occur - such as corrosion, slow 
migration of CO2, dissolution of trace elements in the rock- entailing possible impacts. This paper shows the interest 
of performing a risk analysis and visualising such scenarios in an adequate graphic “risk model”, with the causalities 
between events and processes, considered as objects but being handled easily with a graphic fault tree. Such a tree is 
presented here in a very generic way, but it was developed in order to be applied for specific contexts or case 
studies. The paper also presents a complete classification of all “impacting phenomena” that are likely to concern 
any element of the CCS chain, at surface or underground levels, either in the short term or in the longer term. The 
specific challenge, both from a technical point of view and in a social perspective, is that we have to consider 
complex processes in the longer term, which brings a specific uncertainty due to our lack of knowledge. This 
advocates for the use both “risk models” and “physical models”.  
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